ISSUE 5.1
The State of Local Democracy: Do Maslikhats Have Real Power?
March 4, 2025
In Kazakhstan, three key actors are responsible for governing at the local level: the local executive governments called Akimats (headed by Akims - the most significant actors), the local representative bodies called Maslikhats (municipal councils of elected deputies), and the local population. In principle, these actors must collaborate and act in alignment with central government policies to address local community needs.
However, as we demonstrate in this issue, Maslikhats are rarely effective in representing voters and serving as a check on the local executive branch. At the same time, people tend to stay uninformed about ways to engage with Akims and Maslikhats or influence their decisions. This leads to local executives who pursue their self-defined priorities instead of communal interests by controlling resources, exercising authority, and dominating decision-making.
This state of affairs persists despite ongoing governmental attempts at political decentralization, which involve developing independent and capable Maslikhats and participatory mechanisms by empowering local communities. As the central government drafts its third consecutive strategic framework on advancing local self-governance - the Concept for 2025-2030 - it will have to confront many of the same unresolved issues supposed to be targeted by earlier reforms.
Approximate reading time: 15 min
Lead-author: Aliya Mustafina | Co-authors: Zhibek Akimova & Daniyar Baimagambetov | Research assistant: Akmaral Eric
In Kazakhstan, three key actors are responsible for governing at the local level: the local executive governments called Akimats (headed by Akims - the most significant actors), the local representative bodies called Maslikhats (municipal councils of elected deputies), and the local population. In principle, these actors must collaborate and act in alignment with central government policies to address local community needs.
However, as we demonstrate in this issue, Maslikhats are rarely effective in representing voters and serving as a check on the local executive branch. At the same time, people tend to stay uninformed about ways to engage with Akims and Maslikhats or influence their decisions. This leads to local executives who pursue their self-defined priorities instead of communal interests by controlling resources, exercising authority, and dominating decision-making.
This state of affairs persists despite ongoing governmental attempts at political decentralization, which involve developing independent and capable Maslikhats and participatory mechanisms by empowering local communities. As the central government drafts its third consecutive strategic framework on advancing local self-governance - the Concept for 2025-2030 - it will have to confront many of the same unresolved issues supposed to be targeted by earlier reforms.
Approximate reading time: 15 min
Lead-author: Aliya Mustafina | Co-authors: Zhibek Akimova & Daniyar Baimagambetov | Research assistant: Akmaral Eric
Recent Dynamics
On May 15, 2024, the draft Law on Local Self-Government (intended to replace the earlier version) was withdrawn from the parliament’s lower chamber - Majilis. The Ministry of Economy, which worked on this draft Law since 2021 has repeatedly delayed its introduction to Majilis due to criticism from independent experts who serve on a parliamentary advisory body. Upon its eventual presentation in May 2024, the Ministry incorporated a few expert recommendations. These were insufficient to address the draft’s weaknesses, ultimately leading to its withdrawal following disapproval from Majilis deputies.
This delay, deadlock and inability to unilaterally adopt the draft Law demonstrated that Majlis members refused to rubber-stamp the proposals of the Ministry of Economy. Unusual for a non-democratic regime, the dynamic seems to signal genuine efforts of politicians to address the matter. More importantly, it underscores the complexity of designing effective local self-governance within Kazakhstan’s political realities.
Essentially, the adoption of this new Law is envisioned by the second Concept of Local Self-Governance Development for 2021-2025, a comprehensive policy package detailing the challenges and governmental plans. While the first (2012) Concept merely laid the groundwork for local self-government mechanisms, the second (2021) was expected to confront more specific impeding factors, marking a new wave of reforms. The latter can also be viewed as one manifestation of President Tokayev’s "Listening state" policy, which presupposes government responsiveness to citizens' needs.
In fact, the latest 2021 Concept rightly identified blurred responsibilities between local administration and self-government as a key institutional weakness, hindering the effectiveness of local Maslikhats and participatory mechanisms. It also highlighted low citizen engagement in the work of governmental bodies. Despite the state’s recognition of these issues, and proposals ranging from education campaigns to digital participation tools, the practical implementation fell short in several critical areas.
The following challenges of local self-governance persist: the underdeveloped legal framework, weak Maslikhat autonomy, limited transparency and accountability of Maslikhats and Akims, and unfavourable conditions for citizen participation in local affairs. At the core is the absence of genuine public representation in governance, let alone meaningful influence over decision-making.
In Kazakhstan, where social tensions are an ever-present risk, this is especially concerning. When participation mechanisms yield no results, frustration mounts. As a prominent expert on local self-governance, Andrei Chebotarev claims that restricted participation explains the rise in unsanctioned protests in Kazakhstani regions. News reports also expose poor communication between local communities and authorities, as observed in incidents like the road closure by residents in Dolan village in the Almaty province in August 2024. One may even argue that, in Kazakhstani realities, the absence of local social tensions or scandals with Akims can be considered a KPI for effective self-governance.
The 2022 Bloody Qantar (January) unrest, a manifestation of citizens’ fading patience with "social injustice and political stagnation," serves as a stark example of extreme social tension turning violent. Genuine citizen participation, however, could strengthen public support for the government, enhance its legitimacy, and sustain the "livelihood of the political elite". This may explain President Tokayev’s increasingly assertive stance on local self-governance in his speech to the nation in May of the same year.
In this issue, which is divided into two parts, we examine the unique difficulties of advancing citizen participation in Kazakhstan, both through deputy representation and direct democratic engagement.
Formal Authority, Limited Autonomy: The Maslikhat Dilemma
One condition for genuine local self-governance is that local executives (Akimats) be strictly accountable to elected deputies (Maslikhats). Yet, the reverse appears to be true.
Established in 1994, Maslikhats consist of part-time deputies serving four-year terms. They have gradually evolved from having limited autonomy, like Soviet-era councils, to being a formal part of the checks-and-balances mechanism. Today, Maslikhats have the power to oversee Akimat operations by approving local budget and development plans (economic, social, and urban), as well as reviewing Akims’ progress reports.
Except for rural areas which constitute the third tier of subnational administration, Maslikhats operate at all other levels. While they have always been able to initiate a vote of no confidence against Akims, in 2013, Maslikhats acquired the formal power to approve Akim candidates proposed by higher authorities (as Akims are not elected at those levels yet) along with their office staff.
As local regulators, Maslikhats set certain local tax rates and develop enforceable guidelines for social services. As public representatives, they can hold public hearings on socially-significant issues to gather information about residents’ concerns.
On May 15, 2024, the draft Law on Local Self-Government (intended to replace the earlier version) was withdrawn from the parliament’s lower chamber - Majilis. The Ministry of Economy, which worked on this draft Law since 2021 has repeatedly delayed its introduction to Majilis due to criticism from independent experts who serve on a parliamentary advisory body. Upon its eventual presentation in May 2024, the Ministry incorporated a few expert recommendations. These were insufficient to address the draft’s weaknesses, ultimately leading to its withdrawal following disapproval from Majilis deputies.
This delay, deadlock and inability to unilaterally adopt the draft Law demonstrated that Majlis members refused to rubber-stamp the proposals of the Ministry of Economy. Unusual for a non-democratic regime, the dynamic seems to signal genuine efforts of politicians to address the matter. More importantly, it underscores the complexity of designing effective local self-governance within Kazakhstan’s political realities.
Essentially, the adoption of this new Law is envisioned by the second Concept of Local Self-Governance Development for 2021-2025, a comprehensive policy package detailing the challenges and governmental plans. While the first (2012) Concept merely laid the groundwork for local self-government mechanisms, the second (2021) was expected to confront more specific impeding factors, marking a new wave of reforms. The latter can also be viewed as one manifestation of President Tokayev’s "Listening state" policy, which presupposes government responsiveness to citizens' needs.
In fact, the latest 2021 Concept rightly identified blurred responsibilities between local administration and self-government as a key institutional weakness, hindering the effectiveness of local Maslikhats and participatory mechanisms. It also highlighted low citizen engagement in the work of governmental bodies. Despite the state’s recognition of these issues, and proposals ranging from education campaigns to digital participation tools, the practical implementation fell short in several critical areas.
The following challenges of local self-governance persist: the underdeveloped legal framework, weak Maslikhat autonomy, limited transparency and accountability of Maslikhats and Akims, and unfavourable conditions for citizen participation in local affairs. At the core is the absence of genuine public representation in governance, let alone meaningful influence over decision-making.
In Kazakhstan, where social tensions are an ever-present risk, this is especially concerning. When participation mechanisms yield no results, frustration mounts. As a prominent expert on local self-governance, Andrei Chebotarev claims that restricted participation explains the rise in unsanctioned protests in Kazakhstani regions. News reports also expose poor communication between local communities and authorities, as observed in incidents like the road closure by residents in Dolan village in the Almaty province in August 2024. One may even argue that, in Kazakhstani realities, the absence of local social tensions or scandals with Akims can be considered a KPI for effective self-governance.
The 2022 Bloody Qantar (January) unrest, a manifestation of citizens’ fading patience with "social injustice and political stagnation," serves as a stark example of extreme social tension turning violent. Genuine citizen participation, however, could strengthen public support for the government, enhance its legitimacy, and sustain the "livelihood of the political elite". This may explain President Tokayev’s increasingly assertive stance on local self-governance in his speech to the nation in May of the same year.
In this issue, which is divided into two parts, we examine the unique difficulties of advancing citizen participation in Kazakhstan, both through deputy representation and direct democratic engagement.
Formal Authority, Limited Autonomy: The Maslikhat Dilemma
One condition for genuine local self-governance is that local executives (Akimats) be strictly accountable to elected deputies (Maslikhats). Yet, the reverse appears to be true.
Established in 1994, Maslikhats consist of part-time deputies serving four-year terms. They have gradually evolved from having limited autonomy, like Soviet-era councils, to being a formal part of the checks-and-balances mechanism. Today, Maslikhats have the power to oversee Akimat operations by approving local budget and development plans (economic, social, and urban), as well as reviewing Akims’ progress reports.
Except for rural areas which constitute the third tier of subnational administration, Maslikhats operate at all other levels. While they have always been able to initiate a vote of no confidence against Akims, in 2013, Maslikhats acquired the formal power to approve Akim candidates proposed by higher authorities (as Akims are not elected at those levels yet) along with their office staff.
As local regulators, Maslikhats set certain local tax rates and develop enforceable guidelines for social services. As public representatives, they can hold public hearings on socially-significant issues to gather information about residents’ concerns.
Nonetheless, the empowerment of Maslikhats remains underwhelming. Budget approvals are largely formalities, as affirmed by the chair of the ruling party, "Amanat", at the first Republican Forum of Maslikhat deputies. Meanwhile, President Tokayev emphasizes that public trust in Maslikhats stands at just 53% (2023).
The primary cause is the overly-powerful Akimats. The law defines them as part of local self-governance alongside Maslikhats and the people, yet it lacks a clear legal separation of powers between them, as both the 2021 Concept and independent assessments stress. As a result, no aspect of Maslikhats' operations remains beyond Akimats’ intervention. Thus, despite formally having extensive powers, Maslikhats tend to be restricted in autonomy.
Notably, "Ak Zhol" party deputies in parliament argue that legal gaps prevent Maslikhats from adjusting the centrally determined retail tax rate without approval from Akimats. Similarly, recent local media reports on deputies' failed attempt to block the Korgalzhyn district Akim’s appointment further illustrate the de facto limits of Maslikhats’ authority.
The executive’s preeminence is likely reinforced by extensive informal networks and, arguably, deputies' vested interests, fostering cooperation between them and their Akim. Some members of parliament openly assert that Maslikhat deputies are 'subordinate' to Akims. This subordination can be attributed to informal repercussions deputies could face when opposing Akims' decisions, which discourages dissent. According to 2020 data, the nationwide composition of Maslikhats included business people (35.1%), education specialists (18.1%), and akimat-affiliated employees (5.3%), groups whose professional or financial stakes are, to varying degrees, tied to Akimat support. Beyond securing personal interests, there could be a deliberate pursuit of shared goals between Akims and Maslikhat deputies. The fact is, the majority of Akims and deputies belong to the "Amanat" party, which incentivizes cooperation. Close ties and potential vested interests may explain why a recent survey (November 2024 – January 2025) by the Free Alliance of Euro-Asian Sociologists found that 19.5% of 1,240 citizens consider local government a key obstacle to the country’s development – the second most chosen option, after corruption (21.5%).
Ultimately, these patterns are maintained by low citizen participation and inadequate reforms. Without public "demand" and state "supply" for Maslikhats’ empowerment, their weakness becomes a self-perpetuating reality.
Designed to be accountable solely to the public, Maslikhats remain unchecked when citizens fail to monitor their performance. This holds, as most citizens cannot name a single deputy (68% of respondents nationwide in 2016, 65% in Astana in 2024). Moreover, many citizens seem unaware of the functions Maslikhats perform and the right to seek their assistance. With little public control, deputies can loosen their commitment to public outreach and communication. Minimal public hearings undermine deputies’ roles as public consultants and advocates, leading to uninformed decisions or passive approval of Akimats' initiatives, such as in Almaty, the largest and most diverse city, where the budget plan has never been opposed.
The primary cause is the overly-powerful Akimats. The law defines them as part of local self-governance alongside Maslikhats and the people, yet it lacks a clear legal separation of powers between them, as both the 2021 Concept and independent assessments stress. As a result, no aspect of Maslikhats' operations remains beyond Akimats’ intervention. Thus, despite formally having extensive powers, Maslikhats tend to be restricted in autonomy.
Notably, "Ak Zhol" party deputies in parliament argue that legal gaps prevent Maslikhats from adjusting the centrally determined retail tax rate without approval from Akimats. Similarly, recent local media reports on deputies' failed attempt to block the Korgalzhyn district Akim’s appointment further illustrate the de facto limits of Maslikhats’ authority.
The executive’s preeminence is likely reinforced by extensive informal networks and, arguably, deputies' vested interests, fostering cooperation between them and their Akim. Some members of parliament openly assert that Maslikhat deputies are 'subordinate' to Akims. This subordination can be attributed to informal repercussions deputies could face when opposing Akims' decisions, which discourages dissent. According to 2020 data, the nationwide composition of Maslikhats included business people (35.1%), education specialists (18.1%), and akimat-affiliated employees (5.3%), groups whose professional or financial stakes are, to varying degrees, tied to Akimat support. Beyond securing personal interests, there could be a deliberate pursuit of shared goals between Akims and Maslikhat deputies. The fact is, the majority of Akims and deputies belong to the "Amanat" party, which incentivizes cooperation. Close ties and potential vested interests may explain why a recent survey (November 2024 – January 2025) by the Free Alliance of Euro-Asian Sociologists found that 19.5% of 1,240 citizens consider local government a key obstacle to the country’s development – the second most chosen option, after corruption (21.5%).
Ultimately, these patterns are maintained by low citizen participation and inadequate reforms. Without public "demand" and state "supply" for Maslikhats’ empowerment, their weakness becomes a self-perpetuating reality.
Designed to be accountable solely to the public, Maslikhats remain unchecked when citizens fail to monitor their performance. This holds, as most citizens cannot name a single deputy (68% of respondents nationwide in 2016, 65% in Astana in 2024). Moreover, many citizens seem unaware of the functions Maslikhats perform and the right to seek their assistance. With little public control, deputies can loosen their commitment to public outreach and communication. Minimal public hearings undermine deputies’ roles as public consultants and advocates, leading to uninformed decisions or passive approval of Akimats' initiatives, such as in Almaty, the largest and most diverse city, where the budget plan has never been opposed.
Breaking the Cycle of Disengagement
The 2021 Concept promised two key changes to enhance Maslikhat accountability and effectiveness: (a) promoting transparency through online broadcasting of Maslikhat meetings (2021) and (b) improving institutional design by introducing the role of chairperson (2023) - an "enhanced" version of the secretary, now authorized to set meeting agendas and cast tie-breaking votes.
While better leadership suggests better efficiency, online broadcasting of local Maslikhat sessions was neither fully nor consistently implemented, implying limited progress in transparency. The tangible measure to ensure accountability followed after the violent Qantar unrest in 2022. For the first time (in November 2022), citizens were granted real power to express dissatisfaction with a Maslikhat’s performance through an imperative mandate, a mechanism allowing them to withdraw a deputy's mandate. Previously, the only consequences of deputies’ misconduct were condemnation and coercion into a public apology, with the severity of punishment being eventually determined by a vote among Maslikhat deputies.
More fundamentally, the post-Qantar reforms sought to address the lack of genuine political representation. As part of the 2022 electoral reforms aimed at making parliament more representative of the population - discussed in our third issue - Maslikhat elections also underwent changes. Unlike the exclusively party-list elections of 2021, the 2023 Maslikhat elections followed a mixed voting system. At the city-region and provincial levels (first subnational tier), deputies were elected equally through party lists (50%) and single-mandate districts (50%). At the second tier - districts in provinces, districts within cities, and towns of province significance - elections switched to being conducted entirely through single-mandate voting. Notably, this was the re-introduction of independent candidates, as deputies had been elected under a fully majoritarian system from 1994 until 2021.
This electoral reform enabled more candidates to compete for Maslikhat seats. In the 2023 elections, independent candidates (1081) outnumbered party representatives (689) in single-mandate races. However, it did not result in more independents in Maslikhats, as they secured only 11% of seats. This may be explained by resource constraints, steep registration fees (350,000 KZT or $700 USD), and limited campaigning opportunities.
Likewise, electoral changes did not necessarily boost participation. Despite several alterations, turnout across Kazakhstan has steadily declined - 2016 (77.1%), 2021 (66.3%), and 2023 (52.9%). Although a more complex explanation is needed, this outcome could be attributed to low public trust in local institutions, growing skepticism, a broader global shift in social values resulting from economic growth, and a basic lack of awareness.
Overall, one can notice that a vicious cycle perpetuates the weakness and unrepresentativeness of Maslikhats. Limited autonomy from akims — stemming from an inadequate legal framework that allows Akimats to almost capture Maslikhats — is coupled with insufficient institutional accountability to citizens, further eroding public trust and discouraging engagement. Low citizen interest in learning about their representatives reinforces this disconnect. As a result, unchecked local executives are free to disregard the interests of the communities they serve. The cancellation of a citizen-led memorial for Pshon, the dog who heroically aided the Atyrau community during a flood, symbolizes the executives' disregard for public sentiment, with Maslikhats nowhere in sight. The real stakes, however, are far higher.
The challenge lies in breaking this cycle of citizen disengagement. Introducing the imperative mandate and allowing independent candidates were the first meaningful steps in that direction. However, with the draft Law on Local Self-Government withdrawn from the Majilis, it remains unclear when the central government will reintroduce new proposals for local empowerment. Meanwhile, it reaffirms its attention to Maslikhat deputies through holding National Forums of Maslikhats, where deputies from across the country convene to discuss challenges and receive directives from the President.
Even with progress, it is crucial to recognize that Maslikhats' effectiveness cannot but depend on collaboration with the public and input from citizens. Given that deputies work part-time and are limited in both number and expertise, complex issues and rapid societal changes make direct community engagement essential to complement representative bodies. The second part of this issue will explore the challenges faced by participation mechanisms—that is, by the people more directly.
The 2021 Concept promised two key changes to enhance Maslikhat accountability and effectiveness: (a) promoting transparency through online broadcasting of Maslikhat meetings (2021) and (b) improving institutional design by introducing the role of chairperson (2023) - an "enhanced" version of the secretary, now authorized to set meeting agendas and cast tie-breaking votes.
While better leadership suggests better efficiency, online broadcasting of local Maslikhat sessions was neither fully nor consistently implemented, implying limited progress in transparency. The tangible measure to ensure accountability followed after the violent Qantar unrest in 2022. For the first time (in November 2022), citizens were granted real power to express dissatisfaction with a Maslikhat’s performance through an imperative mandate, a mechanism allowing them to withdraw a deputy's mandate. Previously, the only consequences of deputies’ misconduct were condemnation and coercion into a public apology, with the severity of punishment being eventually determined by a vote among Maslikhat deputies.
More fundamentally, the post-Qantar reforms sought to address the lack of genuine political representation. As part of the 2022 electoral reforms aimed at making parliament more representative of the population - discussed in our third issue - Maslikhat elections also underwent changes. Unlike the exclusively party-list elections of 2021, the 2023 Maslikhat elections followed a mixed voting system. At the city-region and provincial levels (first subnational tier), deputies were elected equally through party lists (50%) and single-mandate districts (50%). At the second tier - districts in provinces, districts within cities, and towns of province significance - elections switched to being conducted entirely through single-mandate voting. Notably, this was the re-introduction of independent candidates, as deputies had been elected under a fully majoritarian system from 1994 until 2021.
This electoral reform enabled more candidates to compete for Maslikhat seats. In the 2023 elections, independent candidates (1081) outnumbered party representatives (689) in single-mandate races. However, it did not result in more independents in Maslikhats, as they secured only 11% of seats. This may be explained by resource constraints, steep registration fees (350,000 KZT or $700 USD), and limited campaigning opportunities.
Likewise, electoral changes did not necessarily boost participation. Despite several alterations, turnout across Kazakhstan has steadily declined - 2016 (77.1%), 2021 (66.3%), and 2023 (52.9%). Although a more complex explanation is needed, this outcome could be attributed to low public trust in local institutions, growing skepticism, a broader global shift in social values resulting from economic growth, and a basic lack of awareness.
Overall, one can notice that a vicious cycle perpetuates the weakness and unrepresentativeness of Maslikhats. Limited autonomy from akims — stemming from an inadequate legal framework that allows Akimats to almost capture Maslikhats — is coupled with insufficient institutional accountability to citizens, further eroding public trust and discouraging engagement. Low citizen interest in learning about their representatives reinforces this disconnect. As a result, unchecked local executives are free to disregard the interests of the communities they serve. The cancellation of a citizen-led memorial for Pshon, the dog who heroically aided the Atyrau community during a flood, symbolizes the executives' disregard for public sentiment, with Maslikhats nowhere in sight. The real stakes, however, are far higher.
The challenge lies in breaking this cycle of citizen disengagement. Introducing the imperative mandate and allowing independent candidates were the first meaningful steps in that direction. However, with the draft Law on Local Self-Government withdrawn from the Majilis, it remains unclear when the central government will reintroduce new proposals for local empowerment. Meanwhile, it reaffirms its attention to Maslikhat deputies through holding National Forums of Maslikhats, where deputies from across the country convene to discuss challenges and receive directives from the President.
Even with progress, it is crucial to recognize that Maslikhats' effectiveness cannot but depend on collaboration with the public and input from citizens. Given that deputies work part-time and are limited in both number and expertise, complex issues and rapid societal changes make direct community engagement essential to complement representative bodies. The second part of this issue will explore the challenges faced by participation mechanisms—that is, by the people more directly.
