Issue 4

ISSUE 4

From Central Control to Local Empowerment: Building Capacity in Kazakhstan's Local Governments

October 3, 2024

You last heard from us a while ago, and that is because what began for our editorial board as an exploration of local self-governance in Kazakhstan evolved into a broader series of articles covering different aspects of decentralization power dynamics in the country.

Although Kazakhstan is the ninth-largest country in the world, it remains a unitary state. Local governments operate within a highly centralized vertical executive system, dependent on the top for decision-making, responsibilities, and resources. This dependence turns local authorities into agents of the central government, not self-governing units. It severely limits their political, administrative, and fiscal powers, undermining their responsiveness even to the most pressing community needs. Because decision-makers at the central level are too detached from local contexts, they cannot provide prompt, effective, and comprehensive solutions. At the same time, the subordination to the center weakens local governments’ accountability to the communities they govern and strengthens political patronage, both of which result in inefficient public administration.

Despite former President Nazarbayev mentioning the need for decentralization as early as the late 1990s, the actual devolution of powers to local governments has been rather slow, focusing primarily on the lowest administrative levels and constrained by the established system’s characteristics.

In this and the following issue, we focus specifically on the state’s recent political decentralization efforts. We examine whether the introduction of direct elections for local government heads (akims) and the advancement of alternative mechanisms for citizens' inclusion in public policy-making fulfil the intended goals of decentralization. Our final issue will conclude with an analysis of fiscal powers as a crucial element in enabling genuine self-governance.

Approximate reading time: 15 min
Lead-author: Aliya Mustafina | Co-authors: Zhibek Akimova & Daniyar Baimagambetov

Centralized Executive

Kazakhstan’s administrative-territorial unit division retained much of the complicated Soviet organization, structured as a top-down hierarchy across three tiers. The first subnational tier includes 17 oblasts (provinces) and so-called city-regions: the capital, Astana, and the two major cities, Almaty and Shymkent. Oblasts are further divided into districts and towns of oblast significance. This second tier also includes districts within cities, if there are such. The third tier consists of the towns of district significance, rural clusters, villages, and settlements. While central authorities set national programs and policies, the general direction for oblast development, and the budget, lower levels (second and third) are responsible for administering these plans under the supervision of oblasts (acting as an intermediary). Importantly, the central government dominates all tiers of governance.

One reason for establishing a highly centralized executive in independent Kazakhstan was to address growing regional economic disparities and deter the emergence of disloyal regional elites due to significant revenues from resource extraction and increased foreign direct investments in specific regions. Additionally, the risks of separatism in the north and east, populated mainly by ethnic Russians, were also considered.

In this context, Nazarbayev’s mentioning of decentralization in his 1997 address to the nation predominantly implied delegating functions from the central government to regional administrations to improve organizational efficiency. Because the executive’s larger goal was to implement national plans successfully, they prioritised accountability to higher authorities and strong “strategic” control as necessary arrangements.

First Steps Toward Reform

Genuine decentralization - increasing the authority and capacity of subnational tiers for self-governance - was not part of institutional efforts until 2012 when 'The Concept of Local Self-Governance Development for 2013-2020’ was adopted by President Nazarbayev. In terms of political decentralization, which includes the participation of citizens in decision-making, there were two significant contributions: local self-governing bodies in the form of "meetings” and “gatherings” of the local community were designed, and akims at the rural (third tier) level, who were previously unquestionably appointed, started being chosen through votes by local representative bodies known as maslikhats. Nevertheless, as a seven-year program, the reforms have been too cautious, offering little progress at a slow pace. Their implementation was further limited by low citizen participation rates and the de facto powerless nature of both maslikhats and the local meetings/gatherings.

Overall, providing citizens with the opportunity to influence the course of local governance is central to the principal democratisation argument. However, the practical argument of bringing decision-making closer to the local level may carry more weight for both policymakers and citizens. Early public engagement identifies priority areas based on real community needs, preventing unnecessary costs and leading to more effective, innovative solutions. Moreover, involving local stakeholders increases demands for transparency and accountability, as administrators’ actions are more closely monitored so that projects adopted on paper are not executed only formally but are done so with high quality, fully resolving the local problem raised by local residents.

Meaningful Changes?

Recognising previous shortcomings, newly elected President Tokayev adopted a new Concept of Local Self-Governance in 2021 as a shorter four-year plan that included several steps toward decentralized governance. Its commitment to more tangible citizen engagement is demonstrated through the suggested (1) advancement of participatory budgeting, (2) utilization of digital tools for engagement and transparent reporting, (3) educational campaigns on self-governance participation, and (4) enhancing the efficiency of maslikhats and local community meetings.

Yet, the introduction of direct elections for the third-tier akims drew the most public and expert attention, marking the first direct election of sub-national executive heads in Kazakhstan. To clarify, akims are present in each administrative unit and lead local akimats, the executive bodies tasked with providing public services, planning local budgets, and managing local development programs. In the first two tiers, they continue to be appointed.

Direct Akim Elections: Bringing Governance Closer to the People

In May 2021, the power to elect rural akims shifted from district-level (second tier) maslikhats directly to local residents. Unlike higher tiers, where akimat and maslikhat exist as a pair, rural administrative subdivisions lack the latter, meaning their akims were previously chosen by somewhat distant representative bodies. This arrangement, along with the presidential authority to dismiss rural akims (abolished only in 2022) undermined citizens' role in authorizing their local leaders.

In governance, allowing citizens to directly elect local government heads redirects their accountability from the central authorities to residents, incentivising akims to build connections with their communities and serve people better. In comparison, appointed akims tend to prioritize the expectations of their superiors, diluting the intended focus on citizens. A 2021 scholarly interview with seven rural akims appointed between 2010 and 2018 revealed that they identified more with higher-level authorities than with their local community.

Overall, as of September 2024, around 2500 (90%) of rural akims were elected as their predecessors’ term expired. Citizen interest in both voting and running for office has proven to be strong. Voter turnout in rural elections was generally higher than in national ones, particularly in areas with independent candidates. The prospect of electing someone concerned with the local problems that people can trust energized communities. At the same time, officials report that citizens out of the governance sphere obtained a chance to become local leaders, securing approximately 60% of these positions despite the early 2021 results revealing that the majority of the elected rural akims were incumbents and state officials. To improve competitiveness and broaden the pull of candidates, the education requirement was lowered to allow individuals with technical and vocational education to run for election. In short, these elections, when competitive, showed that Kazakhstanis are ready for local democracy.

Facing Reality: Resistance to Independent Candidates

Despite the enthusiasm, elections had their severe shortcomings. One of them is the resistance within the existing structure to accept independent candidates.

Numerous independent candidates across the country reported facing bureaucratic resistance and informal pressure. Mr Azamat Kenzhegaliyev in the West Kazakhstan Oblast had to appeal the committee’s refusal to register his application, submitted thirty minutes before the deadline. Although he won in court, Kenzhegaliyev missed the elections because of the subsequent criminal investigation that automatically prevented him from running for office. Notably, it was closed two months later in the absence of evidence.

In Aktogai, a village in the Abay region, elections were rerun as the election committee reported multiple violations of the voting process. The candidate who led the initial results, Dastan Aubakirov, did not participate for the second time, citing pressure from the district akim and the head of the election committee to revoke his campaign under the threat of cutting off financing should he take office.

These cases reveal that even in the smallest, relatively uncompetitive elections, there are interest groups utilizing institutional connections to challenge and discourage independent candidates. While the risks of patronage—admitting individuals based on loyalty to power holders rather than service to the local community—are more common in appointment scenarios, reported pressures suggest that patronage can also weaken genuine competition within the electoral system. It’s noteworthy that ruling party candidates dominated most poll results, even with many fresh faces in the race. Overall, the section indicates the control that higher executive officials can exert over candidates for local akim positions and the pressures they apply against independent candidates.

Facing Reality: The Persistence of Subordination

Even when akims are genuinely elected, citizens' demands to address local issues often remain unmet because the overarching institutional framework keeps elected akims dependent on the higher authorities’ discretion.

In a September interview with an independent journalist, the ex-akim of Kenkiyak village confided that all his development proposals were rejected by the higher district-level akimat, which controls budget allocation. He further explained that institutions like the police and schools report directly to the district akimat, bypassing the village akim. Similarly, contractors providing services to the village stay accountable to the district authorities for submitting work completion reports. The ex-akim noted that the selection of those contractors is influenced by informal connections, with the same companies being repeatedly chosen, resulting in low-quality work.

The authority and fiscal power of the district-level body in this case undermine the rural akim’s status. Yet the failures are blamed on him, citing incompetence. Meanwhile, rural akims are discouraged from reaching oblast (provincial) akims - the most powerful and feared figures in the hierarchy - as it would damage district akimat’s reputation. Having spoken openly about the district-level executive’s disregard for village issues, the Kenkiyak akim, widely supported by his community, was dismissed after three years of service out of a supposed four.

This same state of helplessness is evident in Tort-Kudyk, where the village akim had to seek help from the opposition journalist Boreiko to bring attention to a water supply issue after the long struggle to receive support from district authorities. According to the akim, his numerous requests were met with bureaucratic papers containing evasive answers without actually addressing the problem. Like in the case of independent candidates, he was asked to step down and reported receiving threatening hints.

Sergey Khudyakov, an independent expert involved in developing the first (2013) and second (2021) Concept of Local Self-governance Development, articulates the issue as the continued subordination of rural akims to district authorities due to the lack of fiscal powers, which can leave local initiatives unsupported. Under the existing law, these authorities have power to dismiss rural akims from elected office, while the local community cannot do so.

In many cases, district akims issue orders to rural ones, overburdening them and diminishing their capacity to focus on addressing specific local needs. The law’ vague clause on handling local issues implies any instructions from above concerning local matters should be fulfilled. Surprisingly, some village akims accept this, citing the need to implement central government policies. Although many responsibilities are being devolved through administrative decentralization, the unclear division of responsibilities and authorities is yet to be resolved.

Summing up, as fiscal and administrative centralization continue to characterize the system, elections seem limited in incorporating citizens’ preferences into governance, with the central government arguably unwilling to weaken its control.

So, Do the Local Akim Elections Matter?

Any expansion of democratic participation is crucial for Kazakhstan, as it, hopefully, lays the foundation for long-term and irreversible broadening of political rights. This is exemplified by the President's recent announcement to extend direct akim elections to second-tier municipalities—districts within oblasts and cities, and towns of oblast significance—following the 2023 pilot elections. Building on the relatively strong turnout in rural polls, the even higher voter turnout and the increase in self-nominated candidates in the higher level pilot elections suggest the reforms enhance electoral culture and political engagement.

However, whether these changes lead to improved governance is an open question. Instances of unfair competition are replicated at the new electoral level, as informal pressure and bureaucratic resistance have also been observed. This means that accountability among some new leaders may still be tied to the existing power structures, leading to a weak reliance on citizens in shaping the course and the focus of their work.

Even if competition is genuine, democratic participation without substantial local control limits self-governance. Rural akims lack sufficient autonomy to implement their own initiatives, which reveals the need for political, fiscal and administrative decentralization to be advanced simultaneously for meaningful outcomes. For elections to make a difference, the constraining hierarchical dependence should be eased. Currently, elections are a convenient tool for higher authorities to shift responsibility for local problems onto elected akims. The challenges may differ at the second, comparatively independent tier of governance, but whether political decentralization reforms will bring intended outcomes remains to be seen.

Lastly, elections alone offer limited opportunities for local self-governance, with hands-on involvement in public policy-making being another essential component of political decentralization. In our next issue, we examine the various mechanisms facilitating this engagement and explore if they have grown strong within the decentralization dynamics.

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