ISSUE 3
How can Kazakhstan have a Strong Parliament with Weak Parties?
July 22, 2024
You may have read here and there about President Tokayev’s Zhana (New) Kazakhstan, a political modernization course prompted by the unprecedented Qandy Qantar (Bloody January) unrest.
As part of this modernization, the public was promised a stronger parliament and an easier registration of political parties, which would hold the executive branch politically accountable and reduce the overconcentration of power in the hands of the president and the ruling party.
In this article, we explore why the attempts to build a strong parliament remain rhetorical. We argue that parliamentarism in Kazakhstan remains weak because the regime does not allow the entrance of strong political parties, which could potentially disrupt the status quo.
Approximate reading time: 10 min
Lead-author: Aliya Mustafina | Co-author: Zhibek Akimova | Line editor: Ayaulym Matisheva
The Kazakhstani Parliament: Domination of the Party of Power
In the bi-cameral parliament of Kazakhstan, 98 representatives are elected through direct elections into Majilis, the lower chamber. The higher chamber, i.e. Senate, consists of 40 regional representatives chosen by indirect elections and 10 presidential appointees. As of 2023, 51% of surveyed Kazakhstani citizens approve of the parliament’s performance, according to the Center for Social and Political Research “Strategy”.
A strong parliament plays three important roles: making laws, overseeing the executive branch, and representing diverse groups of voters. Even if the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan sets up a weak parliament with a strong presidency, the directly elected Majilis is intended to be a primary space for deliberation, debates, and dissent among political parties and, more recently, independent candidates. Equally important is its oversight function, as alternative political parties counterbalance the ruling party’s interests, hold the executive accountable, and ensure a clear separation of powers.
However, Kazakhstan's Majilis is controlled by the party of power, Amanat (formerly 'Nur Otan' and 'Otan'), which prevents it from performing the three roles described above. Amanat has held the absolute majority in the Majilis since 2004, with 2007 marking the year when it was the only party to cross the required 7%. Founded in 1999, the party originated from a public support office for presidential candidate Nursultan Nazarbayev. As a charismatic and successful leader who also enjoyed positive propaganda, Nazarbayev’s significant public support extended to his party.
From 2012 to 2022, Amanat shared the parliament with just two other parties, which can hardly be considered its challengers, as they were either aligned with Amanat’s general political direction or co-opted by it. One of the two, the Democratic Party 'Akzhol,' frames itself as a constructive opposition, representing business and middle-class interests, and criticizes government policies on small and medium-sized businesses and tax burdens. In contrast, the socialist People’s Party, which advocates for social justice and legal equality, supports economic nationalization and increased social security, arguing that the government currently fails to provide these adequately.
First, both parties were formed from above by individuals originally affiliated with power, also coming from the same pool of political legacy as former president Nazarbayev and incumbent president Tokayev, raising doubts about their independent voter support and ability to truly represent societal demands. Second, these parties criticize government policies mostly on marginal issues, signifying that the parliamentary opposition remains largely aligned with the ruling party. Third, their oppositional sentiment is weakened by their support of the president and acknowledgement of election fairness, which is recognized neither by international nor independent domestic election observers. Thus, these parties can be characterized as pro-presidential.
In fact, throughout its existence, Amanat has merged with 7 registered political parties and several political movements, which demonstrates these groups' readiness to compromise, their lack of distinctive ideologies, and most importantly, the overall absence of strong oppositional sentiments among Amanat's 'sparring partners.’ When it comes to public opinion, regional sociological monitoring by the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies in 2022 revealed that only 50.8% of those surveyed trust political parties.
In the bi-cameral parliament of Kazakhstan, 98 representatives are elected through direct elections into Majilis, the lower chamber. The higher chamber, i.e. Senate, consists of 40 regional representatives chosen by indirect elections and 10 presidential appointees. As of 2023, 51% of surveyed Kazakhstani citizens approve of the parliament’s performance, according to the Center for Social and Political Research “Strategy”.
A strong parliament plays three important roles: making laws, overseeing the executive branch, and representing diverse groups of voters. Even if the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan sets up a weak parliament with a strong presidency, the directly elected Majilis is intended to be a primary space for deliberation, debates, and dissent among political parties and, more recently, independent candidates. Equally important is its oversight function, as alternative political parties counterbalance the ruling party’s interests, hold the executive accountable, and ensure a clear separation of powers.
However, Kazakhstan's Majilis is controlled by the party of power, Amanat (formerly 'Nur Otan' and 'Otan'), which prevents it from performing the three roles described above. Amanat has held the absolute majority in the Majilis since 2004, with 2007 marking the year when it was the only party to cross the required 7%. Founded in 1999, the party originated from a public support office for presidential candidate Nursultan Nazarbayev. As a charismatic and successful leader who also enjoyed positive propaganda, Nazarbayev’s significant public support extended to his party.
From 2012 to 2022, Amanat shared the parliament with just two other parties, which can hardly be considered its challengers, as they were either aligned with Amanat’s general political direction or co-opted by it. One of the two, the Democratic Party 'Akzhol,' frames itself as a constructive opposition, representing business and middle-class interests, and criticizes government policies on small and medium-sized businesses and tax burdens. In contrast, the socialist People’s Party, which advocates for social justice and legal equality, supports economic nationalization and increased social security, arguing that the government currently fails to provide these adequately.
First, both parties were formed from above by individuals originally affiliated with power, also coming from the same pool of political legacy as former president Nazarbayev and incumbent president Tokayev, raising doubts about their independent voter support and ability to truly represent societal demands. Second, these parties criticize government policies mostly on marginal issues, signifying that the parliamentary opposition remains largely aligned with the ruling party. Third, their oppositional sentiment is weakened by their support of the president and acknowledgement of election fairness, which is recognized neither by international nor independent domestic election observers. Thus, these parties can be characterized as pro-presidential.
In fact, throughout its existence, Amanat has merged with 7 registered political parties and several political movements, which demonstrates these groups' readiness to compromise, their lack of distinctive ideologies, and most importantly, the overall absence of strong oppositional sentiments among Amanat's 'sparring partners.’ When it comes to public opinion, regional sociological monitoring by the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies in 2022 revealed that only 50.8% of those surveyed trust political parties.
Former president Nazarbayev's visit to the head office of the Nur-Otan party (now Amanat) (Akorda)
The issue is all the more prevalent given that the ruling party is deeply integrated with the executive branch, undermining the principle of separation of powers between legislative and executive. With the president serving as the party chairman (until recently) and centralizing power, Amanat’s efforts have consistently focused on implementing presidential initiatives. This showcases the party's executive-based nature, characterized by its top-down operations and alignment with the executive branch's agenda.
Indeed, Amanat exhibits characteristics of having permanent structures that are more typical of government institutions. Within Amanat, organizations like the Academy of Political Management, which trains akims (local governors) and deputies affiliated with the party, and the Institute of Public Policy, which provides analytical and informational support, blur the lines between party and state by integrating governmental functions. Over the years, the party has also built significant infrastructural presence and resources throughout the country, allowing it to maintain permanent operations. In comparison, other registered parties have little representation in the executive and across the country.
Furthermore, the ultra-dominance of Amanat, with party members in all key executive positions, results in party interests subtly influencing supposedly neutral political institutions. This is especially evident in elections, which are consistently criticized as unfair. Electoral processes tend to skew in favor of Amanat, as evidenced by many bureaucratic obstacles for independent candidates and opposition parties.
As a result, the political monopoly of Amanat remains largely unchallenged, limiting the strength of the opposition. In this context, parties in the parliament lacking strong social support, incapable of representing societal demands from below, and keeping the executive in check are what we define as weak parties.
Did President Tokayev Weaken the Dominance of Amanat in the Parliament?
Upon taking office, newly elected President Tokayev initiated reforms to relax the barriers to party registration, undoing the arrangements left by his predecessor, Nazarbayev. Although Nazarbayev's reforms at the time were framed as promoting competition and fostering party development, they were, in reality, unreasonably burdensome and restrictive for small parties, contrary to international democracy-building guidelines. For instance, the minimum requirement for the geographic distribution of party members severely limited political participation and was inconsistent with the right to free association. Restrictions like that prevented the ability of political opposition from emerging in Kazakhstan for the last 16 years (2006-2022).
In 2020, as part of his political modernization agenda, Tokayev incrementally reduced the membership threshold from 40,000 to 20,000 and the minimum requirement for regional representatives from 1,000 to 600 people. However, it wasn't enough to bring new political players. Only after the Qantar events in 2022 - a crisis that exposed the urgent need to remove Nazarbayev’s loyalists from parliament - were the barriers significantly lowered to 5,000 members and 200 regional representatives. As a result, the pro-government Green Party Baitaq and the center-right Respublica party, representing modern business interests, were registered.
Additionally, the thresholds for joining the parliament were eased: in 2021, the minimum stipulation for a party to be represented in parliament was slightly lowered from 7% to 5% of the votes, and in 2023, independent candidates were given the chance to participate in Majlis elections with the reinstatement of the single-mandate system. Altogether, these changes transformed the parliament's composition from including 3 parties to 6 parties and 7 independent candidates, demonstrating a recording representation rate since the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, Amanat continues to dominate the parliament as evidenced from the tables below.
Indeed, Amanat exhibits characteristics of having permanent structures that are more typical of government institutions. Within Amanat, organizations like the Academy of Political Management, which trains akims (local governors) and deputies affiliated with the party, and the Institute of Public Policy, which provides analytical and informational support, blur the lines between party and state by integrating governmental functions. Over the years, the party has also built significant infrastructural presence and resources throughout the country, allowing it to maintain permanent operations. In comparison, other registered parties have little representation in the executive and across the country.
Furthermore, the ultra-dominance of Amanat, with party members in all key executive positions, results in party interests subtly influencing supposedly neutral political institutions. This is especially evident in elections, which are consistently criticized as unfair. Electoral processes tend to skew in favor of Amanat, as evidenced by many bureaucratic obstacles for independent candidates and opposition parties.
As a result, the political monopoly of Amanat remains largely unchallenged, limiting the strength of the opposition. In this context, parties in the parliament lacking strong social support, incapable of representing societal demands from below, and keeping the executive in check are what we define as weak parties.
Did President Tokayev Weaken the Dominance of Amanat in the Parliament?
Upon taking office, newly elected President Tokayev initiated reforms to relax the barriers to party registration, undoing the arrangements left by his predecessor, Nazarbayev. Although Nazarbayev's reforms at the time were framed as promoting competition and fostering party development, they were, in reality, unreasonably burdensome and restrictive for small parties, contrary to international democracy-building guidelines. For instance, the minimum requirement for the geographic distribution of party members severely limited political participation and was inconsistent with the right to free association. Restrictions like that prevented the ability of political opposition from emerging in Kazakhstan for the last 16 years (2006-2022).
In 2020, as part of his political modernization agenda, Tokayev incrementally reduced the membership threshold from 40,000 to 20,000 and the minimum requirement for regional representatives from 1,000 to 600 people. However, it wasn't enough to bring new political players. Only after the Qantar events in 2022 - a crisis that exposed the urgent need to remove Nazarbayev’s loyalists from parliament - were the barriers significantly lowered to 5,000 members and 200 regional representatives. As a result, the pro-government Green Party Baitaq and the center-right Respublica party, representing modern business interests, were registered.
Additionally, the thresholds for joining the parliament were eased: in 2021, the minimum stipulation for a party to be represented in parliament was slightly lowered from 7% to 5% of the votes, and in 2023, independent candidates were given the chance to participate in Majlis elections with the reinstatement of the single-mandate system. Altogether, these changes transformed the parliament's composition from including 3 parties to 6 parties and 7 independent candidates, demonstrating a recording representation rate since the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, Amanat continues to dominate the parliament as evidenced from the tables below.
So, Was the Parliament Strengthened?
In his speech, President Tokayev stated that the political monopoly was set to give way to real political competition. However, while Amanat’s share is becoming smaller as he wished, the parties that are registered and make it into parliament are a-priori filtered through bureaucratic hurdles and the approval of the corresponding decision-makers.
In Zhana Kazakhstan, the party registration process is highly regulated and influenced by political considerations. At least 10 public associations have tried to register since 2019 - a sign of growing political activism - but were continually denied by the Ministry of Justice due to bureaucratic issues. “Alga, Kazakhstan!” activists were denied registration as a party under the pretext of the inclusion of “dead people and minors as members,” with the overall number of rejections being as many as 24. Meanwhile, initiators of “Namys” found it physically impossible to gather all 1000 people at once - a strict requirement for the party’s founding congress, which was also very costly. “Yntymaq” activists have been denied registration as a party 9 times while claiming to give no reason for the denials.
Notably, many parties that have not been registered advocate for proposals that might endanger the ruling status quo. Among these proposals are the release of political prisoners, the overhaul of law enforcement and judicial systems, and thorough investigations into the Qantar and Zhanaozen shootings, as well as the murders of activists and journalists. Those are demands for justice coming from below. Such demands are rather disturbing, inconvenient, and diverging in terms of values and loyalty to the regime.
Moreover, we bear witness to the continuous prosecution and suppression of the independent opposition during Tokayev's presidency. The non-systemic opposition’s meetings are disrupted and stopped on their way to the Ministry of Justice for registration, while the participants are pressured by law enforcement agencies who arrest them before the meetings, detaining members on trains and planes. They are accused of “unsanctioned protests” despite being denied approval in 11 cities and even redirected to the department of fight against extremism.
The leaders and activist groups of the unregistered "El tiregi" and "Alga, Kazakhstan" were convicted in 2023 on the grounds of corruption, as well as for "expressing their support to the extremist parties" and "disturbing public order". The civic society recognizes them as political prisoners, for they have been vocal about the imperfections in Kazakhstan's political system, publicly criticizing the authorities. While the systematic silencing of dissenting voices is characteristic of repression, the authorities deny the existence of political prisoners in Zhana Kazakhstan, stating that “the main signs of political persecution are censorship, special laws, and punitive authorities,” which are absent in the country.
What appears true is that loyalty to the ruling regime is an important criterion for deciding whether certain oppositions can obtain legal recognition and participate in state politics. As the sociologist Beisembayev argued, the Kazakhstani elections are a mechanism for the authorities to accept parties and people that are favorable to it. This tendency can be observed as an overarching characteristic of the political system.
With a "loyal" opposition existing, there is a clear division between "insiders" and "outsiders," and the parliament becomes a place for insiders. In contrast, outsiders are excluded from running in the elections. Being invited to participate as "experts"' in the working groups on drafting specific laws thus remains the only option for outsiders to voice their ideas in the parliamentary process. However, this invitation seems to be at the discretion of the Amanat leaders in the Majlis.
Described as an electoral autocracy, the political system of Kazakhstan continues to permit only limited opposition. Filtered parties will not genuinely influence political decisions nor hold the intertwined ruling party and executive accountable. This is why the reforms are relatively selective, with the government needing more time to prepare for a debate with real opposition. President Tokayev’s reforms may broaden the representation of voices, but they do not necessarily foster active clashes and their decent balancing in the parliament. With Amanat’s agenda and influence preserved by holding majority parliamentary seats, the authorities are seen as taking well-calculated risks. To reiterate, the system currently allows only weak and loyal opposition, thereby disabling the parliament from being genuinely representative, overseeing the executive branch, and adopting more sound policies.
In his speech, President Tokayev stated that the political monopoly was set to give way to real political competition. However, while Amanat’s share is becoming smaller as he wished, the parties that are registered and make it into parliament are a-priori filtered through bureaucratic hurdles and the approval of the corresponding decision-makers.
In Zhana Kazakhstan, the party registration process is highly regulated and influenced by political considerations. At least 10 public associations have tried to register since 2019 - a sign of growing political activism - but were continually denied by the Ministry of Justice due to bureaucratic issues. “Alga, Kazakhstan!” activists were denied registration as a party under the pretext of the inclusion of “dead people and minors as members,” with the overall number of rejections being as many as 24. Meanwhile, initiators of “Namys” found it physically impossible to gather all 1000 people at once - a strict requirement for the party’s founding congress, which was also very costly. “Yntymaq” activists have been denied registration as a party 9 times while claiming to give no reason for the denials.
Notably, many parties that have not been registered advocate for proposals that might endanger the ruling status quo. Among these proposals are the release of political prisoners, the overhaul of law enforcement and judicial systems, and thorough investigations into the Qantar and Zhanaozen shootings, as well as the murders of activists and journalists. Those are demands for justice coming from below. Such demands are rather disturbing, inconvenient, and diverging in terms of values and loyalty to the regime.
Moreover, we bear witness to the continuous prosecution and suppression of the independent opposition during Tokayev's presidency. The non-systemic opposition’s meetings are disrupted and stopped on their way to the Ministry of Justice for registration, while the participants are pressured by law enforcement agencies who arrest them before the meetings, detaining members on trains and planes. They are accused of “unsanctioned protests” despite being denied approval in 11 cities and even redirected to the department of fight against extremism.
The leaders and activist groups of the unregistered "El tiregi" and "Alga, Kazakhstan" were convicted in 2023 on the grounds of corruption, as well as for "expressing their support to the extremist parties" and "disturbing public order". The civic society recognizes them as political prisoners, for they have been vocal about the imperfections in Kazakhstan's political system, publicly criticizing the authorities. While the systematic silencing of dissenting voices is characteristic of repression, the authorities deny the existence of political prisoners in Zhana Kazakhstan, stating that “the main signs of political persecution are censorship, special laws, and punitive authorities,” which are absent in the country.
What appears true is that loyalty to the ruling regime is an important criterion for deciding whether certain oppositions can obtain legal recognition and participate in state politics. As the sociologist Beisembayev argued, the Kazakhstani elections are a mechanism for the authorities to accept parties and people that are favorable to it. This tendency can be observed as an overarching characteristic of the political system.
With a "loyal" opposition existing, there is a clear division between "insiders" and "outsiders," and the parliament becomes a place for insiders. In contrast, outsiders are excluded from running in the elections. Being invited to participate as "experts"' in the working groups on drafting specific laws thus remains the only option for outsiders to voice their ideas in the parliamentary process. However, this invitation seems to be at the discretion of the Amanat leaders in the Majlis.
Described as an electoral autocracy, the political system of Kazakhstan continues to permit only limited opposition. Filtered parties will not genuinely influence political decisions nor hold the intertwined ruling party and executive accountable. This is why the reforms are relatively selective, with the government needing more time to prepare for a debate with real opposition. President Tokayev’s reforms may broaden the representation of voices, but they do not necessarily foster active clashes and their decent balancing in the parliament. With Amanat’s agenda and influence preserved by holding majority parliamentary seats, the authorities are seen as taking well-calculated risks. To reiterate, the system currently allows only weak and loyal opposition, thereby disabling the parliament from being genuinely representative, overseeing the executive branch, and adopting more sound policies.
