INSIDE opinion
The Green Loophole: Unpacking Kazakhstan's Pro-Coal Rhetoric
March 4, 2026
Akerke Akhmetova is a Master of Public Policy candidate at Nazarbayev University whose research focuses on climate-AI governance and environmental policy in Central Asia. Drawing on years of grassroots experience in local climate networks, her opinion piece explores the growing disconnect between Astana's physical climate reality and the state's shifting energy rhetoric. She analyzes how the government reframes legacy assets like coal and nuclear power to secure international green finance without disrupting the status quo.
While the Editorial Board provides editing support to our authors, each opinion piece reflects the author’s personal lens and does not represent the Board’s views.
Akerke Akhmetova is a Master of Public Policy candidate at Nazarbayev University whose research focuses on climate-AI governance and environmental policy in Central Asia. Drawing on years of grassroots experience in local climate networks, her opinion piece explores the growing disconnect between Astana's physical climate reality and the state's shifting energy rhetoric. She analyzes how the government reframes legacy assets like coal and nuclear power to secure international green finance without disrupting the status quo.
While the Editorial Board provides editing support to our authors, each opinion piece reflects the author’s personal lens and does not represent the Board’s views.
The Green Loophole: Unpacking Kazakhstan's Pro-Coal Rhetoric
Living in Astana, the biting cold of January is brutal. But the numbers are beginning to tell a different story.
My own data visualizations of Astana's temperatures over recent years reveal a clear, undeniable warming trend in both January and July (see Figure 1). We are experiencing climate change in real-time, right here in the capital.
Living in Astana, the biting cold of January is brutal. But the numbers are beginning to tell a different story.
My own data visualizations of Astana's temperatures over recent years reveal a clear, undeniable warming trend in both January and July (see Figure 1). We are experiencing climate change in real-time, right here in the capital.
Figure 1: Average winter and summer temperature trends in Astana (2000–2025). Source: Data compiled from pogodaiklimat.ru
Yet, in a surprising rhetorical turn, recent domestic messages have referred to the global climate agenda as a "massive fraud", even going so far as to echo Donald Trump's claims and quote his statement: "I like coal, I don't like wind." For a country renowned for its active engagement in global climate agendas through the signing of agreements and hosting of international forums, this drastic shift has alarmed the local climate community.
Is this a genuine 180-degree policy reversal, or a calculated rhetorical outlier?
As a first-year Master’s student in Public Policy at Nazarbayev University with years of experience in Kazakhstan’s climate civil society, from leading national sustainability networks to researching climate-AI governance, I have closely tracked our evolving climate discourse. To understand the true nature of this shift, I implemented inductive coding on a collection of 15 recent presidential speeches: 6 annual “State of the Nation” addresses and 9 speeches delivered at various international and domestic forums.
Climate action, as decades of research show, is deeply dependent on political framing. By analyzing these 15 speeches, a clear pattern emerges: Kazakhstan is not abandoning the green agenda. It is selectively reframing it to protect its core economic and energy assets.
Let’s dive deeper into the insights from this narrative analysis to see exactly how and why the story has changed.
Is this a genuine 180-degree policy reversal, or a calculated rhetorical outlier?
As a first-year Master’s student in Public Policy at Nazarbayev University with years of experience in Kazakhstan’s climate civil society, from leading national sustainability networks to researching climate-AI governance, I have closely tracked our evolving climate discourse. To understand the true nature of this shift, I implemented inductive coding on a collection of 15 recent presidential speeches: 6 annual “State of the Nation” addresses and 9 speeches delivered at various international and domestic forums.
Climate action, as decades of research show, is deeply dependent on political framing. By analyzing these 15 speeches, a clear pattern emerges: Kazakhstan is not abandoning the green agenda. It is selectively reframing it to protect its core economic and energy assets.
Let’s dive deeper into the insights from this narrative analysis to see exactly how and why the story has changed.
From Ecology to Global Crisis
At the national level, explicit mentions of climate change are relatively new. In 2019 and 2020, presidential addresses to the nation focused primarily on local ecology, water infrastructure, and "greening" the economy, but kept the global climate agenda at arm's length. It was not until 2023 that the climate was explicitly framed as a global challenge.
Simultaneously, the water agenda evolved. Initially treated as a purely administrative and infrastructural deficit, water was elevated to a matter of national security and transboundary diplomacy. By 2024, driven by unprecedented floods that accounted for massive natural catastrophes, water issues were explicitly linked to climate-driven hydrological crises.
At the national level, explicit mentions of climate change are relatively new. In 2019 and 2020, presidential addresses to the nation focused primarily on local ecology, water infrastructure, and "greening" the economy, but kept the global climate agenda at arm's length. It was not until 2023 that the climate was explicitly framed as a global challenge.
Simultaneously, the water agenda evolved. Initially treated as a purely administrative and infrastructural deficit, water was elevated to a matter of national security and transboundary diplomacy. By 2024, driven by unprecedented floods that accounted for massive natural catastrophes, water issues were explicitly linked to climate-driven hydrological crises.
Backtracking on Renewables
The most telling shift, however, lies in how Kazakhstan frames its energy transition. In 2021, the domestic narrative championed energy security through atomic power, renewable energy sources (RES), and hydrogen, while explicitly noting that coal was unpopular. The following years highlighted our vast wind and solar potential. At that time, the President justified this path by its inevitability, stating: "The world is moving towards the greening of industry and the economy." This was a "civilized global trend" frame, positioning Kazakhstan as a progressive player.
Yet, as we approached 2025, the rhetoric underwent a drastic turn. The enthusiasm for renewables was replaced by "anti-renewables realism." Instead of the narrative that "the world has transitioned," the new framing heavily emphasized energy security, explicitly positioning renewable energy sources as an insufficient tool to guarantee the nation's needs on their own.
In their place, the term "clean coal" filled the space, alongside atomic energy, framed under the umbrella of national sovereignty and pragmatism. Importantly, this was not a one-time event. This reframing has been consistently echoed across multiple platforms, from formal presidential messages to speeches at the National Kuryltai and the UN General Assembly. The intensity of the language, however, fluctuates depending on the audience: in certain domestic settings, the climate agenda has been bluntly labeled a "fraud," while in other, more diplomatic arenas, the message softens into a firm defense of atomic and coal energy as superior, pragmatic choices for the nation's development.
Even while pushing this fossil-heavy domestic narrative, Kazakhstan's international messaging maintains a noticeably different tone. On the global stage in 2025, the leadership continued to commit to full decarbonization within 35 years and acknowledged the severe climate risks facing Central Asia. The country continues to project an image of active engagement, remaining open to multilateral dialogues, international partnerships, and hosting events like the upcoming Regional Ecological Summit under the UN in 2026. At the same time, this diplomacy carries a firm stance that the "green agenda" cannot be uniformly imposed on resource-rich nations and that coal must be defended as a strategic, technologically cleanable asset.
The most telling shift, however, lies in how Kazakhstan frames its energy transition. In 2021, the domestic narrative championed energy security through atomic power, renewable energy sources (RES), and hydrogen, while explicitly noting that coal was unpopular. The following years highlighted our vast wind and solar potential. At that time, the President justified this path by its inevitability, stating: "The world is moving towards the greening of industry and the economy." This was a "civilized global trend" frame, positioning Kazakhstan as a progressive player.
Yet, as we approached 2025, the rhetoric underwent a drastic turn. The enthusiasm for renewables was replaced by "anti-renewables realism." Instead of the narrative that "the world has transitioned," the new framing heavily emphasized energy security, explicitly positioning renewable energy sources as an insufficient tool to guarantee the nation's needs on their own.
In their place, the term "clean coal" filled the space, alongside atomic energy, framed under the umbrella of national sovereignty and pragmatism. Importantly, this was not a one-time event. This reframing has been consistently echoed across multiple platforms, from formal presidential messages to speeches at the National Kuryltai and the UN General Assembly. The intensity of the language, however, fluctuates depending on the audience: in certain domestic settings, the climate agenda has been bluntly labeled a "fraud," while in other, more diplomatic arenas, the message softens into a firm defense of atomic and coal energy as superior, pragmatic choices for the nation's development.
Even while pushing this fossil-heavy domestic narrative, Kazakhstan's international messaging maintains a noticeably different tone. On the global stage in 2025, the leadership continued to commit to full decarbonization within 35 years and acknowledged the severe climate risks facing Central Asia. The country continues to project an image of active engagement, remaining open to multilateral dialogues, international partnerships, and hosting events like the upcoming Regional Ecological Summit under the UN in 2026. At the same time, this diplomacy carries a firm stance that the "green agenda" cannot be uniformly imposed on resource-rich nations and that coal must be defended as a strategic, technologically cleanable asset.
Is atomic energy clean?
As the enthusiasm for renewables has been met with "anti-renewables realism" domestically, atomic energy has filled the void. The government frames nuclear power not just as a reliable baseline, but as a low-carbon development tool.
On the surface, the logic is sound. Kazakhstan controls over 40% of the global uranium supply, making nuclear power a matter of economic and energy sovereignty. However, calling atomic energy a straightforward “clean” alternative requires a narrower definition of “clean.” Nuclear is often described as “clean” because it produces very low greenhouse gas emissions during electricity generation, and its lifecycle emissions are generally far below those of coal and gas.
However, labeling atomic energy as a straightforward “clean” alternative overlooks important complexities. Beyond inherent accident risks, nuclear power produces radioactive waste that can remain hazardous to ecosystems for thousands of years. It also depends on large and reliable water supplies for reactor cooling. In Kazakhstan, where the first nuclear plant is planned near Lake Balkhash, this creates a clear policy tension. In a country already confronting water scarcity and framing water security as part of a broader climate crisis, reliance on a water-intensive energy source raises difficult governance questions.
As the enthusiasm for renewables has been met with "anti-renewables realism" domestically, atomic energy has filled the void. The government frames nuclear power not just as a reliable baseline, but as a low-carbon development tool.
On the surface, the logic is sound. Kazakhstan controls over 40% of the global uranium supply, making nuclear power a matter of economic and energy sovereignty. However, calling atomic energy a straightforward “clean” alternative requires a narrower definition of “clean.” Nuclear is often described as “clean” because it produces very low greenhouse gas emissions during electricity generation, and its lifecycle emissions are generally far below those of coal and gas.
However, labeling atomic energy as a straightforward “clean” alternative overlooks important complexities. Beyond inherent accident risks, nuclear power produces radioactive waste that can remain hazardous to ecosystems for thousands of years. It also depends on large and reliable water supplies for reactor cooling. In Kazakhstan, where the first nuclear plant is planned near Lake Balkhash, this creates a clear policy tension. In a country already confronting water scarcity and framing water security as part of a broader climate crisis, reliance on a water-intensive energy source raises difficult governance questions.
The "Clean Coal" Illusion
Even more controversial is the rhetorical pivot to “clean coal,” a term that functions more like an umbrella label than a precise technology. Depending on context, “clean coal” may refer to conventional pollution controls (e.g., SO₂ and particulate filters), coal gasification technologies (IGCC), or, increasingly, carbon capture and storage (CCS/CCUS). While China and other countries are advancing CCUS pilots and experimenting with coal gasification pathways, these technologies remain contested and far from unambiguously proven at scale. For example, coal-fired power plants, even if they have CCS technologies, produce millions of tonnes of coal ash that contains toxic heavy metals such as arsenic, mercury, and selenium, which is then disposed of in landfills or unlined pits, causing severe environmental risks Therefore, given the severe environmental degradation from waste and the unproven track record of the technology at scale, it is highly doubtful that "clean coal" can currently live up to its name.
Even more controversial is the rhetorical pivot to “clean coal,” a term that functions more like an umbrella label than a precise technology. Depending on context, “clean coal” may refer to conventional pollution controls (e.g., SO₂ and particulate filters), coal gasification technologies (IGCC), or, increasingly, carbon capture and storage (CCS/CCUS). While China and other countries are advancing CCUS pilots and experimenting with coal gasification pathways, these technologies remain contested and far from unambiguously proven at scale. For example, coal-fired power plants, even if they have CCS technologies, produce millions of tonnes of coal ash that contains toxic heavy metals such as arsenic, mercury, and selenium, which is then disposed of in landfills or unlined pits, causing severe environmental risks Therefore, given the severe environmental degradation from waste and the unproven track record of the technology at scale, it is highly doubtful that "clean coal" can currently live up to its name.
The Reality of Renewables
Despite the skeptical rhetoric, the formal commitments and numbers tell a parallel story. Kazakhstan's share of electricity produced by Renewable Energy Sources (RES) has indeed grown, nearly doubling from 3.5% in 2021 to 7% in 2025 (see Figure 2).
Despite the skeptical rhetoric, the formal commitments and numbers tell a parallel story. Kazakhstan's share of electricity produced by Renewable Energy Sources (RES) has indeed grown, nearly doubling from 3.5% in 2021 to 7% in 2025 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Kazakhstan's share of electricity produced by Renewable Energy Sources (2021–2025). Source: Bureau of National Statistics (stat.gov.kz).
However, when compared to the active RES deployment in neighboring countries like Uzbekistan, where renewables now account for over 20% of total energy production, it becomes clear that renewables in Kazakhstan are treated as an add-on rather than a foundational transition. In stark contrast, coal remains the undisputed backbone of the domestic grid, accounting for nearly 40% of Kazakhstan's total energy mix.
So, why maintain the green commitments at all if the domestic focus is pivoting back to coal and nuclear?
So, why maintain the green commitments at all if the domestic focus is pivoting back to coal and nuclear?
The Investment Incentive
The answer likely lies in capital. Year over year, green investments in Kazakhstan have only increased. Since 2014, total investments in renewables have surpassed $2.6 billion, making the country the second-largest recipient in the region from donors like the EBRD and ADB. As experts on Central Asian environmental politics have argued, the promise of international capital is a primary driver behind Kazakhstan’s climate posturing.
Driven by this financial incentive, Kazakhstan has engaged in a highly performative green agenda by signing agreements and maintaining an active presence at global climate forums, while doing little to dismantle its fossil fuel dependence. As my colleagues and I detailed in a previous policy memo, our ambitious green commitments have consistently lacked the cohesive policy frameworks necessary for real implementation.
The answer likely lies in capital. Year over year, green investments in Kazakhstan have only increased. Since 2014, total investments in renewables have surpassed $2.6 billion, making the country the second-largest recipient in the region from donors like the EBRD and ADB. As experts on Central Asian environmental politics have argued, the promise of international capital is a primary driver behind Kazakhstan’s climate posturing.
Driven by this financial incentive, Kazakhstan has engaged in a highly performative green agenda by signing agreements and maintaining an active presence at global climate forums, while doing little to dismantle its fossil fuel dependence. As my colleagues and I detailed in a previous policy memo, our ambitious green commitments have consistently lacked the cohesive policy frameworks necessary for real implementation.
A New Loophole
Has the agenda shifted toward the outright, institutionalized climate denialism seen in parts of the US? Not exactly. Rather, it has adapted by finding a more convenient “green” loophole. By reframing our legacy assets, such as uranium and coal, as "clean" or "transitional," Kazakhstan is securing its place in the global green finance market without disrupting the status quo. This strategy artificially expands the definition of "green" to maintain the country's progressive image and attract investments, while simultaneously justifying and legitimizing the continued reliance on coal and atomic energy.
Has the agenda shifted toward the outright, institutionalized climate denialism seen in parts of the US? Not exactly. Rather, it has adapted by finding a more convenient “green” loophole. By reframing our legacy assets, such as uranium and coal, as "clean" or "transitional," Kazakhstan is securing its place in the global green finance market without disrupting the status quo. This strategy artificially expands the definition of "green" to maintain the country's progressive image and attract investments, while simultaneously justifying and legitimizing the continued reliance on coal and atomic energy.
Why It Still Matters?
Why does this rhetorical maneuvering matter? We must care because climate action is inherently fragile, relying entirely on political will. When the country's highest leadership adopts 'anti-renewables realism' or dismisses the climate agenda as a 'fraud', it risks legitimizing domestic inaction.
Paradoxically, however, this very pursuit of green capital provides a crucial safeguard. Kazakhstan’s persistent need to maintain a progressive international image and attract green investments keeps the door open. It keeps our diplomats, policymakers, and energy technocrats at the negotiating table, and it drives the slow but real growth of our renewable energy sector. This financial motivation, even if cynical, prevents us from sliding into complete climate isolation.
Ultimately, however, political loopholes can only buy time and capital. They cannot buy immunity from physical realities. As winter and summer temperature trends in Astana show, and the national water deficit worsens, the climate crisis in Kazakhstan is an immediate, physical threat. Expanding the definition of "clean" to include coal might successfully secure international funds today, but it will not cool our cities or fill our reservoirs tomorrow.
Why does this rhetorical maneuvering matter? We must care because climate action is inherently fragile, relying entirely on political will. When the country's highest leadership adopts 'anti-renewables realism' or dismisses the climate agenda as a 'fraud', it risks legitimizing domestic inaction.
Paradoxically, however, this very pursuit of green capital provides a crucial safeguard. Kazakhstan’s persistent need to maintain a progressive international image and attract green investments keeps the door open. It keeps our diplomats, policymakers, and energy technocrats at the negotiating table, and it drives the slow but real growth of our renewable energy sector. This financial motivation, even if cynical, prevents us from sliding into complete climate isolation.
Ultimately, however, political loopholes can only buy time and capital. They cannot buy immunity from physical realities. As winter and summer temperature trends in Astana show, and the national water deficit worsens, the climate crisis in Kazakhstan is an immediate, physical threat. Expanding the definition of "clean" to include coal might successfully secure international funds today, but it will not cool our cities or fill our reservoirs tomorrow.
